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This paper examines the relationship between trade liberalization and the 
evolution of the demand for skill in Brazil during the past decade. We use 
matched employer-employee panel data to test the hypothesis that the 
reduction in input tariffs made it  easier for Brazilian firms to acquire 
technologically-advanced inputs  from abroad,  which raised the demand 
for skilled labor. We find that input tariffs have a negative effect on skill-
upgrading and that this effect is stronger in firms that use inputs that are 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, labor markets in developing countries went through 
important changes both in terms of wage differentials and employment composition of their 
workforce.  One of these c hanges  was the  fast rise in the  supply of  workers with 
intermediate levels of education, both in absolute terms and relative to the supply of high- 
and of  less-educated workers. Moreover, the wage differentials between  college-educated 
workers and those with intermediate levels of education have gone up, at the same time that 
the differentials between the  latter and the workers with up to elementary education  fell. 
These changes had important implications for poverty and inequality.
1 
            At the same time, many Latin-American countries went through trade liberalization 
processes in the 80s and 90s as part of a package of market-orientated reforms. These 
reforms induced important changes in their product markets, by changing relative prices 
and increasing the productivity of manufacturing firms, but also in the labor market, by 
increasing labor reallocation and transitions into the informal sector.
2 A significant body of 
research has been produced trying to link the changes in the wage differentials reported 
above to the trade liberalization process, following a literature that  first  examined the 
impact of trade liberalization on inequality in the U.S. and other developed countries.
3  
           The  theoretical  framework u sed by  most of these studies is the traditional 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. According to this model, since skill is a relatively scarce resource 
in  most Latin-American countries, the opening up of trade with the more developed 
                                                  
1 See Sanchez-Paramo and Schady, (2003), and Gonzaga, Menezes-Filho and Terra (2006), for example. 
2 See Pavcnik (2002), Muendler (2004) and Fernandes (2006) on the effects of trade liberalization on 
productivity and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2006) on its effect on labor market transitions. 
3 See Acemoglu (2002) for a survey on the impact of trade liberalization in developed countries.   3 
countries should bring about a rise in  the  prices of  unskilled-intensive goods, thereby 
increasing  their production and the demand for unskilled workers, which in turn  should 
produce a decline in the skill premium. When confronted with the data, many researchers 
were thus surprised to find that the wage differentials between  college-educated workers 
and those with up to secondary education in developing countries were actually rising. 
             The  first set of  explanations for this apparent rejection of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model  argued  that in order to  understand the impact of trade liberalization on  the skill 
premium, one has to take into account that countries do not move instantaneously from a 
closed to an open economy, but from a pattern of high to one of low tariffs. Moreover, the 
changes in tariffs tend to vary substantially across sectors, depending on the structure of 
protection that prevailed before trade liberalization and in several cases this structure was 
unrelated to the pattern of comparative advantage across industries. Therefore, the changes 
in relative prices during a process of trade opening follow the changes in tariffs and the 
impact of trade liberalization on inequality depends on the correlation between the change 
in tariffs and skill-intensity across manufacturing sectors. Using this framework, Hanson 
and Harrison (1999) and Robertson  (2004) found that trade liberalization was associated 
with the rise in wage inequality in Mexico, whereas Gonzaga, Menezes-Filho and Terra 
(2006) found that the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model were actually consistent 
with the decline in the wage differentials between workers with high school education or 
more and workers with less than high school education in Brazil in the early 1990s.  
               An important limitation of these papers is that the framework they used only 
allowed for two skill groups, while the descriptive evidence summarized above has 
consistently pointed to the different movements in the wage differentials between skilled   4 
and semi-skilled workers on the one hand, and between semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
on the other hand. How could trade opening explain the rise in returns to college education 
and the fall of the returns to upper secondary education that took place in many developing 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s? Two hypotheses were put forward to explain these facts. 
Firstly, it could be that these movements in wage differentials were reflecting the decline in 
the relative supply of college educated workers, which was not increasing as quickly as the 
supply of high school educated workers. Moreover, it could be that relative demand for 
college-educated workers  was rising. Sanchez-Paramo and Schady  (2004) f ound that 
relative demand for college-educated workers has indeed been rising in Argentine, Mexico, 
Chile, Colombia,  with mixed  results  for Brazil.  Fernandes and Menezes-Filho (2003) 
found that allowing for a more general pattern of substitutability between the three skill 
groups, the demand for college educated relative to semi-skilled workers has been rising in 
Brazil for the last couple of decades and so has the demand for the semi-skilled with respect 
to unskilled workers. 
               What could be reason for this process of skill upgrading in developing countries, 
especially in the case of college-educated workers? Theoretically, Acemoglu (2003) points 
out that trade  creates a tendency for the price of skill-intensive goods to increase in 
developed countries, which increases the profitability of innovations directed to these goods 
and may  raise the demand for skilled workers  in developed countries and even in the 
developing  ones,  depending on how skill-abundant they are. Moreover, Thoenig and 
Verdier (2003) point out that trade liberalization could bias the direction of innovations in 
developed countries towards skill-intensive goods because of the threat of technological 
imitation, which would increase wage inequality in developed and developing countries as   5 
well. Feenstra and Hanson (2001) argue that outsourcing of input production by firms in 
developed countries could rise the demand for skill in these countries and in developing 
countries as well, as the outsourced activities are low-skill-intensive from the developed 
countries’ point of view, but skill-intensive from the LDC’s perspective. 
                  Empirically, Feenstra and Hanson (1997) found that foreign direct investment 
increased the relative demand for skill in Mexico and can account for a substantial fraction 
of the rise in skilled-labor wage share.  Pavcnik (2003) f ound that capital-skill 
complementarities can  in part explain the process of skill upgrading in  Chile, while the 
share of imported materials, foreign technical assistance and patented technology are not 
statistically significant once plant fixed effects are controlled for.  Sanchez-Paramo and 
Schady (2003) found that changes in the volume and R&D intensity of imports at the sector 
level tend to increase demand for skill in Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
     In this paper we put forward a different hypothesis. With trade liberalization, the 
reduction in tariffs causes a decline in the prices of skill-intensive traded goods which are 
produced domestically, but it also impacts the price of goods that are used as inputs for the 
production of other goods, making these foreign inputs cheaper for domestic firms. If the 
foreign inputs embody more advanced technology, a process of technological diffusion will 
take place, with the production function  of domestic firms shifting outwards.  Evidence 
supporting this view has been produced by Schor (2003), Lisboa, Menezes-Filho and Schor 
(2003) and Fernandes (2006).  Our  hypothesis  is that this process of diffusion of  new 
technologies through capital and intermediate goods increases the relative productivity of 
more skilled workers. If skilled workers are gross substitutes with respect to the semi-
skilled, this will in turn increase the relative demand for skilled workers as well.   6 
   The main aim of this paper is to test this prediction and in order to reach this aim 
it is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some background information on wage 
differentials and skill composition in Brazil, describes the process of trade liberalization 
and the data used in this paper. Section 3 presents evidence that the relative demand for 
college educated workers has shifted to the right in the period analyzed. In Section 4 we 
test the skill-biased technological diffusion hypotheses and section 5 concludes.     
2. Data Description 
2.1 The Brazilian labor market  
As a background for the empirical exercises to be carried out below, it is worth 
presenting some stylized facts about the Brazilian labor market. Before describing the data 
we define our education groups. Workers with between 0 and 4 years of schooling are 
classified as unskilled; those with between 5 and 11 years as semiskilled; and those with 
over 11 years of study as skilled. This is the criterion commonly used in Brazil for division 
into three skill groups when the proxy for qualification is years of schooling 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the relative supply of skilled workers with respect 
to the semi-skilled and of the latter with respect to unskilled workers. It shows that the 
relative supply of  semi-skilled  workers increased substantially, while that of  skilled 
workers has remained s table or even declined slightly.    Figure 2 shows that  wage 
differentials between  skilled and semi-skilled  workers increased since 1992, while the 
opposite happened to wage differentials between semi-skilled and unskilled workers since 
1990. Since the behavior of the wage differentials is consistent with that of supply, is there 
any role left for demand shocks? Fernandes and Menezes-Filho (2003) show that for any   7 
plausible values of the elasticities of substitution between  the skilled and the semi-skilled 
and between the semi-skilled and the unskilled (which are allowed to be different in their 
model), relative demand has in fact been rising in Brazil both  for the skilled and for the 
semi-skilled. 
              Figure 3 compares the evolution of the relative unemployment rates for workers 
with different levels of skill. It shows that unemployment has in fact increased for all types 
of workers, with a somewhat higher rise for the semi-skilled. In traditional trade models 
there is no role for unemployment, but if there is any kind of rigidities or frictions in labor 
market, such as the difficulty in adjusting the aspirations to the new availability of jobs, 
semi-skilled labor wages would not adjust instantaneously to the rise in their supply and 
hence unemployment would follow. 
In terms of the sector composition of the workforce,  Figure 4 shows that 
manufacturing employment has been  steadily declining over time,  even before trade 
liberalization occurred, with a big chunk of employment moving to the services sector. This 
trend has occurred in several other countries and may be related to a secular rise of income 
or to the rapid rise in labor productivity that took place first in manufacturing. Since this 
paper uses only data from formal sector firms, it is important to describe what happened to 
the labor market as a whole. Figure 5 shows that the share of workers in the formal sector 
has also been  shrinking steadily since 1990, with a corresponding rise in all other labor 
market states. Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2006) show that this can in part be explained 
by the process of trade liberalization. 
2.2 Trade Liberalization   8 
Until the end of the 1980s, Brazilian trade policy meant very high nominal tariffs 
and significant non-tariff barriers. Nominal tariffs were in general redundant, as the price 
wedge between domestic and international prices tended to be lower than that suggested by 
tariffs. Imports were restricted mainly by non-tariff barriers, such as lists of prohibited 
goods, difficult access to government import authorization and limits on imports for each 
firm. On the other hand, there were several exceptions that softened both tariff and non-
tariff barriers to import some specific goods. 
  In 1988 there was the first attempt to rationalize trade policy in such a way that the 
tariffs would express the degree of trade protection already in place. Most of the non-tariff 
barriers were abolished  and nominal tariffs were reduced slightly. In 1990 the newly 
elected government announced a move towards a more open trade regime. At first, all but a 
few non-tariff barriers were eliminated. Trade policy thereafter would rely mostly on tariffs 
and on the exchange rate management (although the exchange rate regime was much more 
flexible than before). Secondly, a four-year schedule of tariff reductions was announced. At 
the end of this period, tariffs would range between 0% and 40%. The government largely 
followed through in its announced promises and the average tariff declined from over 50% 
in 1989 to 14% in 1994. 
The information on tariffs comes from Muendler (2003). Tariffs are available at the 
product level, so in order to construct the output tariffs we matched each product to the 
equivalent two-digit sector definition. To construct the input tariff series for each industry 
we used the information of the input-output tables for various years (i.e. each industrial 
sector’s purchases, per unit of output, of intermediate and capital goods from other sectors)   9 
to construct weights and compute a weighted average of the tariffs prevailing in each of 
these sectors over time.  
Figures  6  and 7 describe the distribution of the  input and  output tariffs across 
sectors in three periods of time:  1988, 1990 and 1994.  Table A1 describes the list of 
sectors. One can see in Figure 6 that in 1988 the dispersion of input tariffs was quite high, 
the industries  with highest input tariffs  being automobiles (12), rubber (16), 
pharmaceuticals (20), other foods (31) and especially apparel (23), which had a tariff rate of 
90%. Between 1988 and 1990 there w as a small across-the-board tariff reduction, in the 
order of 10%. Between 1990 and 1994, the tariff reductions were massive, so that by 1994 
most sectors had tariff rates fluctuating between 10% and 20%. The tariffs in the apparel 
sector, for example, were reduced from 70% to about 20% in this period. 
   2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The database constitutes one of the innovations of this study, as it makes possible to 
work with disaggregated data, which is crucial for the quality of the results. We used 
administrative data from the RAIS - Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (Annual Social 
Information Reports) from the Labor Ministry, and PIA - Pesquisa Industrial Anual (the 
Annual Industrial Surveys) from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 
both covering the manufacturing sector in the State of São Paulo. Both databases cover the 
period from 1990 to 1998, except for a gap in 1991 for the PIA, because this survey was not 
conducted that year.  
The data  we use to examine the hypothesis of skill-biased technological transfer 
utilizes the intersection of the RAIS and PIA databases and requires information on both 
workers and establishments. The data  from the PIA was assembled by Menezes-Filho,   10 
Muendler and Ramey (2004) to meet the IBGE’s needs for confidentiality. Since the data 
from PIA are collected at the level of the firm, but this information is confidential, we put 
together cells of three to five firms, identifying which firms belong to each cell. Initially, 
the firms were separated into groups with some characteristics in common, namely: (i) 
years when the firm appears in the PIA; (ii) sector of industry (2-digit classification) to 
which the firm belongs; and (iii) state where the firm is located.  The cells were  then 
generated randomly within each group.  T he cells are invariant over time, i.e., they have 
data on the same firms in all years, which makes it possible, as we shall see shortly, to 
identify a fixed-effect per cell. Finally, we matched each RAIS firm to the cells of PIA 
firms. The cells that have variations in their composition due to information gaps in the 
RAIS were excluded from the sample.   
3. Preliminary Evidence  
Wages and employment per education group were obtained from RAIS, while data 
on  output and  capital  stock were obtained from PIA.  The information on tariffs was 
obtained from Muendler (2003).  Table 1 below presents descriptive statistics at the cell 
level of the main variables used in the analysis. Figures 7 and 8 describe the evolution of 
relative employment levels by skill. They clearly show that both skill employment ratios 
increased in the period, from 0.26 in 1990 to 0.32 in 1998 in the skilled/semiskilled case, 
and from 1.39 to 3.73 in the semiskilled/unskilled case, which closely mimics the behavior 
of labor supply of the economy as a whole, especially in the semi-skilled case. Figures 9 
and 10 show the evolution of relative wages by skill groups in the period. It can be seen 
that the wage ratio between skilled and semiskilled workers was generally growing (2.66 in 
1990 and 3.04 in 1998) and that the ratio between  the semiskilled and the unskilled was   11 
practically stable (1.19 in 1990 and 1.18 in 1998). It seems therefore that the labor market 
trends in the formal sector were very similar to the stylized facts for the economy as a 
whole, which we described in section 2. 
      In order to better understand the evolution of the skill labor employment we next 
present the decomposition proposed by Berman et al. (1994): 
 
 
where s is the share of skilled workers in the economy;  i e  is the participation of firm i in 
total industrial employment;  i s  is the share of skilled workers in total employment of firm 
i; ? is the difference operator between two points in time; and the bar above the variable 
denotes their temporal mean in the period in question. 
                  This expression decomposes the variation in the share of a determined skill 
group between two moments in time into two components: the variation within firms and 
the variation between firms. If the predictions from the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model 
were valid to explain at least part of the alterations in employment composition described 
here, t he “between” component should have a significant negative sign in the total 
variation, since  the economic opening  would have caused establishments producing 
unskilled labor-intensive goods to increase their production their share in total employment. 
.   Table 2 presents the results of this  decomposition for the variation in relative 
employment between 1990 and 1998 of the skilled and of the semiskilled workers. The 
results show that the participation of skilled workers grew 8.19% between 1990 and 1998. 
Within  Between 
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However, firms that use skilled labor more intensively decreased their relative participation 
in total employment, since the  between term was negative ( -2.88%).  Therefore,  the 
increased participation of skilled workers in  manufacturing was driven by  the variation 
within-firms (11.07%), which was  in part counter-weighted by  traditional Heckscher-
Ohlin-type considerations.   
                The change in the between component for the semiskilled workers, on the other 
hand, is  positive and  corresponds to  25.36% of the total change. Here the between 
component acted in the opposite direction  to the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction, unless we 
consider that Brazil is semi-skilled abundant as compared to its trade partners (see Gonzaga 
et al, 2006). The fact that most of the rise in skilled labor employment occurred within 
single firms is a remarkable finding, in line with the evidence from the more developed 
countries, and it strengthens the need for an explanation for the process of skill upgrading 
that took place in Brazil.
4 
5. Results 
The approach used here closely follows that proposed by Machin and Van Reenen 
(1998), which minimizes a cost function that has wages (W), capital (K) and technology 
(TEC) as arguments. Including a non-correlated random error mit , time dummies (D) and a 
firm-specific effect term ai,, we obtain the following equation: 
                                                  
4 The results of this decomposition are in principle consistent with Feenstra and Hanson (2001), who would 
argue that this process of skill upgrading is the result of outsourcing of input production among Brazilian 
firms.  
   13 
 
where q stands for skilled workers, s for the semi-skilled and n for the unskilled.  Although 
not resulting directly from microeconomic theory, it is interesting to estimate the model 
with wages excluded from the explained variable, i.e., transforming it into the proportion of 
skilled worker in total labor force: 
 
Including in equations (1) and ( 2) the technology proxy, namely  tariffs on imported 
intermediate goods (
in
it T ), we obtain the equations to be estimated: 
 
We also estimate similar equations for the semiskilled workers. 
                 Because tariffs are the main variables in this analysis, it is worth commenting on 
the political economy of tariff reduction. From the policy point of view, the choice 
regarding which industries are more protected and which ones face more competition could 
be non-random. If this were the case, tariffs could be correlated with productivity 
performance before (and perhaps  during) the trade liberalization period, so that 
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a common low level, so that the differences in the changes in tariffs across sectors were 
driven mostly by the initial distribution of tariffs across sectors. But since the equation to 
be estimated contains firm-specific fixed effects, the history of the political economy of 
trade protection up to 1990 is controlled for. 
 The results for the entire period, 1990 to 1998, at the cell level (as explained in 
Section 2) are shown in Table 3.  The equations are initially estimated with weighted least 
squares, weighting the observations by the share of each firm in total industrial employment 
each year and then by a fixed-effect estimator.  We focus first on the proportion of skilled 
workers (columns 1, 2 and 3). The WLS regressions provide evidence of capital–skill 
complementarity and, more importantly, that input tariffs are negatively correlated with the 
share of skilled workers.  The fixed-effect regressions confirm the above results, with 
tariffs impacting the evolution of the share of skilled workers, even after controlling for 
firm-specific heterogeneity. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The third column includes tariffs on final goods (FG) only as a control 
in the regressions, since this variable is likely to be correlated with tariffs on intermediate 
goods, which would bias the coefficient of the latter. Interestingly, this has the effect of 
increasing the coefficient of input tariffs, while output tariffs attract a positive coefficient.
5  
Regarding the semiskilled workers, the WLS regressions suggest that a reduction in 
input tariffs also increases their demand. The fixed-effect regressions, however, show that 
this effect is not robust to the inclusion of firm-level heterogeneity, since the effect of input 
tariffs is now insignificant.    Interestingly, the coefficient on capital is negative and   15 
significant across all  specifications, suggesting that capital and semi-skilled labor are 
substitutes. The bottom panel presents the results of the regressions using the wage bill 
share as dependent variable.  The results do not change qualitatively with respect to the 
employment share ones. Reductions in input tariffs raise the demand for skilled workers but 
do not have a significant impact on the demand for semi-skilled workers. 
Table 4 implements a robustness test to strengthen our confidence that the effects of 
input tariffs on demand for skill are indeed capturing the impact of technological diffusion. 
If this were the case then we would expect this effect to be stronger in industries that use 
inputs that are more likely to be affected by technological innovation, such as computers, 
machines, etc.. Therefore, we again use the input-output tables to construct input weights 
for each sector, but now compute a weighted average of years of education at the input side 
by industry and interact this variable with the input tariffs. The idea is that the impact of 
input tariffs on  the demand for skill should be higher  in firms that use inputs that are 
themselves produced in skill-intensive sectors. The results of Table 4 indicate that this is 
indeed the case, since the interaction term is negative and statistically significant, meaning 
that a decline in tariffs increases the demand for skill by more in sectors that use inputs that 
are more skill-intensive. 
In Table 5 we test the robustness of the results using another proxy of skill. PIA has 
information on the workers’ occupation, defined as blue-collar and white-collar. Blue-collar 
workers are the ones who work directly in  the production process, and can be used as a 
proxy for unskilled workers, as opposed to the white-collar workers, who are not directly 
                                                                                                                                                         
5 It is important to stress output tariffs are introduced in the model just as a control, we do not intend to test 
any trade theory, since,  this would have to take general equilibrium effects into consideration (see Gonzaga et 
al, 2006).   16 
involved in the production process. Table 4 shows that the results of the regressions are 
very similar to the ones that used education as a measure if skills, that is, input tariffs are 
negatively correlated with  skill, even after controlling for firm-specific fixed effects. 
Hence, it is possible to affirm with more credibility that technological shocks, caused by the 
fall in the tariff levels, are really skill-biased. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we examined the impact of trade liberalization on demand for skill in 
Brazil, by examining the impact of input tariffs on  the  employment share of college-
educated workers, using matched employee-employer data. We find that the decline in 
input tariffs has as an important impact on skill-upgrading in Brazil, even after controlling 
for capital deepening, for output tariffs and for fixed effects. This effect is stronger in firms 
that use inputs that are themselves more skill-intensive, and therefore more likely to be 
affected by technological diffusion. It seems therefore that trade liberalization can have 
perverse impacts on inequality, counter-acting Heckscher-Ohlin type considerations, a 
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Min Max Mean Standard Deviation
Number of Skilled Workers 0 802 33.75 71.00
Number of Semiskilled Workers 0 3152 146.48 287.63
Number of Unkilled Workers 0 2311 79.42 179.85
Proportion of Skilled Workers 0 1 0.2051 0.2477
Proportion of Semiskilled Workers 0 1 0.5511 0.2382
Proportion of Unskilled Workers 0 1 0.2437 0.2303
Number Workers 1 4335 259.65 489.09
ln(Value Added) 5.21 86.01 44.75 9.68
ln(Capital) 0 78.30 37.98 15.03
Number of cells 654











Table 2 – Decomposition Within and Between Groups: 1990-98 
  Total Variation  Within  Between   
  Total  Annual  Total  Annual  Total  Annual  Between/total 
Skilled  8,19%  0,68%  11,07%  0,92%  -2,88%  -0,24%  -35,16% 
Semi-Skilled  13,13%  1,09%  9,80%  0,82%  3,33%  0,28%  25,36% 
   20 
WLS WLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Y) 0,000 -0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** 0,000 0,000
(0,0004) (0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0003)
ln(K) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0,0002) (0,0004) (0,0004) (0,0002) (0,0004) (0,0004)
ln(Tariff IG) -0.131*** -0.036** -0.105*** -0.140*** 0.031* 0,020
(0,123) (0,018) (0,027) (0,012) (0,018) (0,027)
ln(Tariff FG) 0.056*** 0,009
(0,016) (0,015)
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
WLS WLS
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ln(Y) 0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 0.001* 0,001 0,001
(0,0004) (0,0004) (0,0004) (0,0003) (0,0004) (0,0004)
ln(K) 0.002*** 0,000 0,000 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0,0003) (0,0004) (0,0004) (0,0002) (0,0004) (0,0004)
ln(Tariff IG) -0.142*** -0.041* -0.124*** 0.133*** 0,022 0,022
(0,015) (0,022) (0,033) (0,012) (0,018) (0,027)
ln(Tariff FG) 0.066*** 0,000
(0,019) (0,016)
Year Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard Errors between parentheses
*** significant at 1%
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
Demand for Skill Regressions
Table 3
Fixed Effect
Dependent Variable: Wage Bill Share of
Skilled Workers Semiskilled Workers
Fixed Effect
Sikilled Workers  Semiskilled Workers
Dependent Variable: Proportion of 
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Table 4 - Demand for Skill Regressions
Skilled workers Semiskilled workers Skilled workers Semiskilled workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Y) -0.001* 0,0003 -0.001*** 0,0004
(0,0003) (0,0003) (0,0004) (0,0003)
ln(K) 0.001*** -0.002*** -0,0002 -0,0006
(0,0004) (0,0004) (0,0005) (0,0004)
ln(Tariff IG) -0,027 0,028 -0,025 0,012
(0,0180) (0,0180) (0,0350) (0,0199)
ln(Tariff IG) * -0.1965*** 0.063** -0.254*** 0.139***
 Input Sector Education (0,0260) (0,0260) (0,0354) (0,0299)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
Standard Errors between parentheses
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%






Occupation as qualification proxy 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
ln(Y) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0007)
ln(K) 0 0 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004* 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln(Tariff IG) -0.013** 0.088*** -0.296*** -0.318*** -0.013** 0.118*** -0.038*** -0.011
(0.0055) (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0122) (0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0110)
ln(Tariff FG) -0.082*** 0.022*** -0.093*** -0.027***
(0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0051) (0.0070)
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard Errors between parentheses
*** significant at 1% 
** significant at 5%
* significant at 10%
Proportion of Skilled Workers Wage Bill Share of Skilled Workers
Dependent Variable
Fixed Effect WLS WLS Fixed Effect
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Table A1 – Industry Definitions and Number of Firms 
Industry Definitions 
2 – Mineral Extraction 
3 -  Oil Extraction 
4 – Non-Metal Mineral Products 
5 -  Basic Metal Products 
6 – Nonferrous Metal Products 
7 – Metal Products 
8 – Machinery and Equipment 
10 – Electrical Equipment 
11 – Electronic Equipment 
12 – Automobiles, Trucks and Buses 
13 – Other Vehicles and Parts 
14 – Wood and Furniture 
15 – Paper, Pulp and Cardboard 
16 – Rubber Products 
17 – Non-oils Chemical Elements  
18 – Basic Petrochemical Products 
19 – Chemical Products 
20 – Pharmaceuticals and Perfumes 
21 – Plastics 
22 – Textiles 
23 – Clothing 
24 – Footwear 
25 – Coffee Products 
26 – Processed Products 
27 – Meat and Poultry 
28 – Processed Dairy Product 
29 – Sugar  
30 – Vegetable Oil 
31 –Beverage and Other Food 
32 – Others 
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Figure 6 - Input Tariffs Across Sectors and Time
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Figure 9 
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